Growing tensions in the Baltic Sea
Russia does not want to jeopardise its freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea. In case of a maritime emergency or accident, there is a risk of messages getting misinterpreted between different parties as each coastal state is protecting its own interests.
In recent years, Russia has been displaying its aggressiveness by using military force in Ukraine and carrying out sabotage attacks in Europe. Russia uses a wide range of means for the purpose of broader influencing. For this reason, the public image created of Russia’s actions and its capabilities may even be misleading. In reality, Russia is not an omnipotent actor; instead, it allocates its resources to activities that best promote its own interests.
In the Finnish security environment, the spotlight has recently fallen on the Baltic Sea in particular. Several cases of damage to undersea infrastructure have increased tensions and military presence in the area. Shipping in the Baltic Sea directly affects the coastal states of the region, and there is underwater infrastructure important to many countries in the sea area.
The relatively shallow Baltic Sea has in recent years become an increasingly busy transport route and more congested in terms of undersea infrastructure. The volume of shipping has increased, and the vessels are coming from more flag states than before, the flag state being the country where a vessel is registered. At the same time, the number of submarine communications cables in the Baltic Sea has doubled over the past few years. A good illustrative example of the size of the Baltic Sea is that, for example, in the Danish straits with a high volume of traffic, the waters are no deeper than 20 metres at the lowest.
RUSSIAN SHADOW FLEET
Vessels used to circumvent sanctions imposed by Western countries, carrying oil or liquefied natural gas. The vessels operate under a variety of covert and shifting ownership and insurance arrangements. The vessels are usually old and in poor condition.
The Baltic Sea is Russia’s channel to the West
For Russia, the Baltic Sea is of vital importance because Russia uses it as a route for its shadow fleet to transport oil. Oil is the cornerstone of the Russian economy and a source of revenues to finance its warfare in Ukraine. According to the SUPO’s assessment, Russia is making every effort to safeguard its opportunities to practise free shipping. The country will not take any voluntary risks that could deteriorate its freedom of navigation. To Russia, the Baltic Sea is also an undersea channel to the West: most of the network traffic from Russia to the West is transmitted via cables in the Baltic Sea.
Western countries also want to protect their own freedom to operate in the area. The coastal states are prepared to react readily to anything that could threaten their critical infrastructure and shipping. Under these circumstances, the often repeated saying describing Finland’s logistical position as an island appears to be even more important than before: Finland cannot replace the huge volume of maritime logistics with any other modes of transport via Sweden. It is in Finland’s interests to ensure that no such changes happen in the Baltic Sea that would jeopardise our security of supply. On the other hand, the network connections Finland has to Europe, for example, are highly fault-tolerant. Even several simultaneous cable failures would do nothing more than slow down the connections.
Cable damages have been a common occurrence in the Baltic Sea for decades
The cases of damage to undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea have gained a lot of publicity recently, but it is not a very rare phenomenon. Ship anchors have been regularly damaging cables in the Baltic Sea throughout the 21st century, even though the incidents have not made the news. The damage has mainly occurred during the autumn and winter months. Statistically, the number of cases of cable damage in recent years is quite typical for the Baltic Sea. However, the increase in undersea infrastructure has created a situation in which it is easy for more cables to be damaged in individual cases.
Based on the recurrence of infrastructure damage, it is not possible to draw any conclusions of the intentionality of the incidents or possible state influencing, but each incident must be investigated separately. State influencing activities always have a goal and a motive, and they must somehow benefit the perpetrator. Just causing confusion is not a sufficient reason to engage in risky actions that have had negative consequences even for Russia. The incidents of ships dragging their anchors in recent years have damaged not only Western undersea infrastructure but also Russia’s own infrastructure.
In cases of damage involving such infrastructure as submarine cables it is typically difficult to find evidence to totally exclude state-sponsored involvement. However, in principle, identifying or verifying Russia’s influencing activities is not exceptionally difficult, and Western countries have succeeded in doing so. For example, the Western intelligence community has consistently been able to identify and attribute Russian sabotage activities when attacks have taken place in continental Europe.
Increased tensions may lead to misinterpretations
Cooperation between the Western countries and Russia has been run down, which is also reflected in communications related to the Baltic Sea. The current situation in the Baltic Sea presents a high risk of misinterpreting the actions taken by others.
The distrust related to the freedom of navigation is so great across all coastal states – including Russia – that military presence in the region is unlikely to diminish any time soon. Russia is seeking to safeguard vessels in its shadow fleet by escorting them with naval vessels and placing guards on board. The dilapidated vessels of the Russian shadow fleet will keep on sailing in the Baltic Sea for a long time to come, as Russia will adapt its actions to the sanctions imposed against it.