

PHENOMENA FALLING WITHIN SUPO'S FIELD OF COMPETENCE AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT ARE EVALUATED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND CYBER ESPIONAGE TARGETING FINLAND AND FINNS

Foreign intelligence activities targeting Finland will remain active in the next few years. Cyber espionage and attacks will be targeted more and more against actors that are close to the target organisations and have less information security awareness than they.

Foreign intelligence targeting Finland is active. Dozens of foreign intelligence officers are permanently stationed in Finland. Furthermore, it is assessed that circa the same number of foreign intelligence officers come to Finland and carry out short-term operational assignments each year. Typical features of foreign intelligence services' activity in Finland are planning and long duration. Primary intelligence aims are forecasting Finland's policies in various fields and influencing political decisions. Foreign intelligence services are also interested in Finnish technology and associated expertise.

Cyber espionage targeting Finland is also active. Malware attacks have been carried out more indirectly than before. They have been directed towards companies producing services for the actual espionage targets or entities being otherwise close to the targets. Cyber espionage attempts attributed to the Russian state in public discourse and the media have targeted e.g. organisations of state administration, companies cooperating with them, and Finnish companies doing product development and producing services in the energy sector.

The existing maintenance systems of the targets and new kind of malicious software have been made use of in the cyber espionage attacks attributed to Chinese intelligence and security services in public discourse and the media. The product development data of the companies has been of particular interest.

Assessment: Foreign intelligence activities targeting Finland will remain active in the next few years. Countering intelligence activities has become increasingly difficult. Especially the technological development has created new challenges in the countering of threat. Cyber espionage and attacks will be targeted more and more against actors that are close to the target organisations and have less information security awareness than they. They can be used either directly for gathering information or as channel towards the systems of the target organisations. Combining cyber operations with methods of signal and human intelligence makes intelligence more efficient and facilitates the targeting of operations and penetrating into terminal equipment.

TERRORIST THREAT IN FINLAND

It is likely that in the short run, the terrorist threat will remain elevated at level two on the four-level scale.

The most significant threat is posed by individual actors or small groups motivated by radical Islamist propaganda. The number of CT targets has increased and is now 370. Important factors explaining the rise of the terrorist threat and the number of high-risk CT targets have in the recent years been the increase of indigenous radicalisation and the foreign fighter phenomenon related to Syria and Iraq. The CT targets have more connections to international terrorism and an increasing percentage of them has, for example, taken part in an armed conflict or received terrorist training.

Assessment: It is likely that in the short run, the terrorist threat will remain elevated at level two on the four-level scale. The networks supporting terrorism that are active in Finland are likely to aim at radicalising and recruiting more supporters. It is possible that as the support networks grow, they also tend to conduct operational activity.

Threat levels are used to describe the terrorist threat against Finland and Finnish interests. The factors taken into account when assessing the threat level are the available intelligence, the operational capacity and motivation of terrorist organisations or individuals and groups linked to them, and the time span of possible attack plans.

Terrorist threat in Finland
4. Severe
3. High
2. Elevated
1. Low

DOMESTIC EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS

Domestic extremism is likely to remain more or less at the current level in the near future, even though individual actors pose a potential threat that is hard to anticipate.

In its current form, domestic extremism does not pose a threat to national security. From the point of view of national security, the most noteworthy extremist movement is the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement. The Turku Court of Appeal upheld the Pirkanmaa district court's decision to disband the NRM. This judgment is not yet legally final.

More and more persecution and hate campaigns are observed within the extreme right and anti-immigration circles. They have been targeted against authorities, journalists and researchers, among others. If the large-scale hostile influencing becomes more commonplace, it may weaken the vital functions of the society.

The most significant threat related to domestic extremism is posed by individual actors.

Assessment: Domestic extremism is likely to remain more or less at the current level in the near future, even though individual actors pose a potential threat that is hard to anticipate.

HYBRID INFLUENCING

Finland is subject to active hybrid influencing. Hybrid influencing aims at narrowing the national sovereignty, for example. The readiness of state actors to use efficient influencing means in order to promote their interests remains high.

Hybrid influencing is activity done especially by major powers. They aim at promoting their own interests through a wide selection of methods and at causing damage to the target country by narrowing the national sovereignty, for example. The vulnerabilities of the target country are exploited and efforts are often made to conceal the real entity behind the activity.

Finland is subject to active influencing. Hybrid influencing is not a new phenomenon but through its strengthening and complexity, the phenomenon has become an increasing security threat. State actors are more willing to use even far-reaching influencing means than before. Influencing means used against Finland include or could include e.g. information campaigns, political pressure, undermining of border stability, increase of economic influence and exploiting of the negative phenomena of economic life, influencing through infrastructure projects, cyber operations and military show of strength.

Assessment: The readiness of state actors to use even efficient influencing means in order to promote their interests remains high.


DEVELOPMENT OF TERRORISM SITUATION IN 2015–2018

- Threat of self-organised terrorism *elevated*, risk of attacks directed from abroad *low*
- The conflict in Syria increased radicalisation
- Around 50 individuals travelled from Finland to the conflict area in Syria
- Circa 70 individuals known to have travelled to the conflict areas
- Around 15 deceased in fighting and 20 returned to Finland
- Two criminal investigations concerning suspected murders committed with a terrorist intent in Iraq; no evidence of crimes
- Terrorist threat assessment updated in June; threat at level 2 (*elevated*)
- The first radical Islamist terrorist attack in Finland in August: a lone actor stabbed bystanders in Turku; two persons were killed and nine got injured
- No changes in the terrorist threat assessment; terrorist threat still *elevated*
- Most significant threat posed by self-organising lone actors
- Number of CT targets risen nearly 25% in four years
- No change in the number of foreign fighters


2015



2016



2017



2018

